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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
plants.30 Whereas the 1977 amendments do provide for extensions of the
section 301(b)(1)(B) interim deadline, neither those amendments nor the
1972 amendments provide for any extensions of the final July 1, 1983
compliance deadline. Perhaps the courts or EPA will exercise discretion
similar to that considered in State Water Control Board3' and refuse to
punish good faith noncompliers with the 1983 deadline, but there is pres-
ently no statutory authority for extensions of that deadline.
Sco'r E. TINNON
VIII. EVIDENCE
A. Impeachment of Witnesses
The rule forbidding the impeachment of one's own witness was well
established at common law.' The common law rule led to the often difficult
question of who qualified as a party's own witness within the meaning of
the rule. 2 While most state courts still apply some variation of the common
law rule, 3 recently enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 6071 allows the im-
peachment of a witness by either party.
In Utility Control Corp. v. Prince William Construction Co.,
5 the
3 FWPCA § 301(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V. 1975).
31 The Fourth Circuit attempted to soften the impact of its holding, see text accompany-
ing notes 9-21 supra, by stating that sanctions would not be applied in every case of noncom-
pliance with the 1977 deadlines. 559 F.2d at 927. If a noncomplying pollutor was able to show
a good faith effort to comply with the terms of FWPCA, the court noted that, by exercise of
the EPA's prosecutorial discretion or the courts' equitable discretion, dischargers might avoid
prosecution or punishment for such innocent noncompliance. Id.
I For a history of the common law rule forbidding the impeachment of one's own witness,
see Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 CHI. L. REV. 69, 69-
76 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Ladd]. See also 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 896 at 659-60
(Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WiGMORE]. Reasons given for the existence of
the common law rule against the impeachment of one's own witness include: that a party
morally binds himself to the statements of his witness, that a party guarantees or vouches
for his witness, and that a party should not have the means to coerce his own witness.
Graham, Examination of a Party's Own Witness Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A
Promise Unfulfilled, 54 TEx. L. REV. 917, 919 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Graham].
I Superficially, the test of whether a witness is one's own is whether the party seeking to
impeach the witness elicited testimony about a material issue from the witness. See WIGMORE,
supra note 1, at § 909. However, the different contexts in which the issue can arise require
many variations of the general rule. For examples of these variations, see WIGMORE, supra
note 1, at §§ 910-18.
A few states have eliminated the common law rule forbidding the impeachment of ones
own witnesses entirely. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 785 (West 1966); KAN. CIv. PRo. STAT.
ANN. § 60-420 (Weeks 1976).
FED. R. EvD. 607 provides that: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him."
5 558 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1977).
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Fourth Circuit applied Rule 607 and held that a defendant should be
allowed to impeach a plaintiff's witness even though the plaintiff called
him as an adverse witness. Utility Control sued Prince William Construc-
tion Company (Prince William) for payments due under a contract.6 At
trial in district court, Utility Control called Prince William's former presi-
dent as an adverse witness and, after examining him, moved for a sum-
mary judgment.' Prince William's counsel objected and requested that he
be given at least the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.8 The dis-
trict court denied the request. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed.
In granting Utility Control's motion for summary judgment, the district
court relied heavily on Massie v. Firmstone,I a Virginia Supreme Court
decision. In Massie, a claim for compensation for services rendered was
denied because the plaintiffs own testimony indicated that his compensa-
tion was dependent upon an unfulfilled condition."0 Massie established the
Virginia rule of evidence that requires a party be bound by his testimony
concerning facts and inferences drawn from those facts." The district court
I Calvin Burns, treasurer of Prince William, was joined as a party defendant because he
signed the contract. 558 F.2d at 718. Following the summary against Prince William, the trial
proceeded on the issue of whether Burns had any liability. The district court permitted the
jury to consider that Burns had guaranteed a contract for Prince William approximately a
year and one-half before the Utility Control contract. The jury then found Bums liable to
Utility Control as a guarantor. Id. at 719.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment against Bums. Id. at 721. In
doing so, the court presumed that the district court admitted the evidence concerning Burn's
guarantee under Federal Rule of Evidence 406, which states that evidence of a person's habit
is relevant to prove that the person's conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with
the habit. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that one occasion can not be considered proof of a
habit, and, therefore, the evidence was not relevant within the meaning of Rule 406. 558 F.2d
at 721. The court held alternatively that even if the evidence was relevant, its relevancy was
so slight that the district court should have exercised the discretion given the trial court by
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude the evidence. Id; see Security State Bank v. Baty,
439 F.2d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 1971). Rule 403 states that if the probative value of relevant
evidence is outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice or misleading the jury, the evidence
may be excluded. FED. R. EvD. 403.
1 Summary judgment is rarely granted after a trial begins. 558 F.2d at 719. The purpose
of the summary judgment procedure is to avoid trials where material facts are not disputed.
Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
128 (1977); Bland v. Norfolk & So. R.R., 406 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1969). Therefore, once a
trial has begun the major reason for granting a summary judgment has been lost.
I Prince William's counsel also stated that he could produce other evidence in support
of Prince William's defense if given the opportunity. 558 F.2d at 718.
134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (Va. 1922).
, Massie involved a claim for compensation by the plaintiff, a real estate broker, who
had found a potential purchaser for a piece of real estate owned by the defendant. Id. at 452,
114 S.E. at 652. The plaintiff's own testimony, however, indicated that his compensation was
dependent on consumation of the sale to the proposed purchaser. The defendant sold the land
to someone else. Although there was testimony from another witness favorable to the plaintiff,
the Virginia Supreme Court held that the testimony could not be considered since the plain-
tiff was bound by his statements of facts and the inferences that could be drawn from them.
Id. at 462, 114 S.E. at 656.
" The Massie rule is based on the theory that a party's case can be no stronger than he
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apparently decided that the testimony of corporate officers is the testi-
mony of the corporation for purposes of the Massie rule. The trial court
reasoned that under Massie, Prince William, as a matter of state law
applicable in the district court, would not be allowed to controvert the
apparent admissions made by its former president on direct examination.
Holding the defendant bound by the testimony of its former president, the
district court found that the evidence showed no genuine issue as to any
material fact concerning Prince William's liability.'
2
The failure of the district court to let Prince William impeach its former
president was an important factor in the Fourth Circuit's decision to re-
verse the district court. Since Prince William would have had the right
under Rule 607 to impeach its former president if he had been called by
Prince William, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that Prince William had the
same right when its former president was called as an adverse witness by
the plaintiff. '3 The court held that impeachment of the witness should have
been permitted by contradiction shown through cross-examination or
through contrary evidence from other sources.' 4
The Fourth Circuit also held that the district court's grant of summary
judgment violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which states the
requirements for granting summary judgment in federal courts.' 5 By re-
ceiving, considering and granting the motion for summary judgment in a
single day, the district court violated the clause in Rule 56(c) that requires
the motion be made at least ten days before the hearing on the motion.'
In addition, by refusing to allow Prince William to cross-examine the wit-
ness upon whose testimony Utility Control relied heavily and by denying
Prince William the time needed to prepare opposing proofs to the motion
for summary judgment, the court effectively denied Prince William the
opportunity to show that a genuine issue was present. In denying Prince
William this opportunity, the trial court violated another of the Rule 56(c)
requirements. 7
The Fourth Circuit also pointed out that the district court was incorrect
in assuming that the Massie rule, a state rule of evidence, was applicable
in a federal court.'6 The court noted that federal evidenciary and proce-
dural standards, rather than state rules, govern whether summary judg-
as a witness makes it. Id. Therefore, when a party's testimony is adverse to himself, the
testimony is to be treated as a judicial admission, conclusive against him. Id. But see C.
McCoRMICK, EUDENCE § 266 (1972) (disapproving rule applied in Massie) [hereinafter cited
as McCoRMICK].
0 558 F.2d at 718.
'3 Id. at 720.
" Id. at 721. In addition to cross-examination, the main source of contrary evidence is
the testimony of additional witnesses. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE 607[05] (1975).
,s 558 F.2d at 719.
,8 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) requires a motion for summary judgment be granted only if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
11 558 F.2d at 719.
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ment is appropriate.'9 In addition to holding that state rules of procedure
were not applicable in federal cases, the Fourth Circuit found that the
district court had misapplied the rule.2" The Virginia Supreme Court has
held that a party is bound only by his testimony as a whole, not by each
individual statement he makes. 2' In Utility Control, Prince William, as
represented by its former president, was not allowed even the opportunity
to complete its testimony.
The Fourth Circuit was correct in holding that Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 607 gave Prince William the right to cross-examine its former presi-
dent. Rule 607's22 broad grant of the power to impeach a witness to "any
party, including the party calling him" clearly indicates that Prince Wil-
liam had such a right. Furthermore, there is no case law that would inter-
pret Rule 607 as inapplicable to the Utility Control fact situation.
Rule 607 is the result of the realization that the common law rule
forbidding the impeachment of one's own witness is based on faulty reason-
ing.? The primary rationale for the common law rule, that a party should
vouch for the testimony of his witnesses, fails to consider that a party
generally has no choice as to who will be his witnesses. 2 The party will call
," Id. at 720. The landmark decision in the area of the procedural standards that govern
federal trials is Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In Hanna, the Supreme Court held
that federal procedural standards (specifically Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1)) are
to govern procedural questions in the federal courts, regardless of the existence of conflicting
state rules. Since Hanna, it has been held repeatedly that federal procedural standards are
to be used in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate in federal cases. Fitz-
simmons v. Best, 528 F.2d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 1976); Northwestern Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Corley,
503 F.2d 224, 231-32 (7th Cir. 1974); Ando v. Great West. Sugar Co., 475 F.2d 531, 534 (10th
Cir. 1973). Federal procedural standards include the law as to the admissibility of evidence.
558 F.2d at 720. Northwestern Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Corley, 530 F.2d 224, 231-32 (7th Cir. 1974).
See generally Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693,700-06,718-25 (1974).
558 F.2d at 720.
21 Baines v. Parker, 217 Va. 100, 105, 225 S.E.2d 403, 407 (Va. 1976); Crawford v. Quart-
erman, 210 Va. 598, 603, 172 S.E.2d 739, 742-43 (Va. 1970); Bond v. Joyner, 205 Va. 292, 295,
136 S.E.2d 903, 905 (Va. 1964). In addition, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that the Virginia
Supreme Court has not applied the Massie rule to a corporate party in the position that
Prince William found itself in Utility Control. While the Massie rule was invoked against a
corporation in Erlich v. Hendrick Constr. Co., 217 Va. 108, 225 S.E.2d 665 (Va. 1976), that
case is distinguishable in that the witness, who was the president and sole stockholder of the
corporation, was viewed as the alter ego of the corporation. See 217 Va. at 111, 225 S.E.2d at
667. In Utility Control, the witness was no longer the president of Prince William and was
only a minority stockholder. In the few other cases involving this situation, the Virginia
Supreme Court held the Massie rule did not apply. See May v. Malcolm, 202 Va. 78, 82, 116
S.E.2d 114, 118 (Va. 1960); Birtcherds Dairy, Inc. v. Randall, 180 Va. 311, 315-16, 23 S.E.2d
229, 231-32 (Va. 1942).
" FED. R. EVID. 607.
Among those authorities who found the premises of the rule forbidding the impeach-
ment of one's own witnesses unacceptable are MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at § 38; Ladd, supra
note 1, at 76-80; Graham, supra note 1, at 919-22; and Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness,
49 VA. LA. REv. 996-1019-20 (1963).
24 Some authorities believe that the rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness
originated from the use in the Middle Ages of trial by compurgation. In such a trial, a party
could, by taking an oath, establish his plea of defense if several people selected by the party
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those who ,have knowledge of the facts involved in the case. The other
major justification for the rule against impeaching one's own witness is
that the power to impeach a witness gives the caller the power to coerce
the witness into testifying as desired or face an attack on his character.2
This rationale fails to consider the fact that the adverse party can impeach
the witness. Thus, in addition to possible perjury charges, a witness who
allows his testimony to be influenced by the threat of an attack on his
character by the party who called him will still face the same type of attack
from the opposing party. 6 The coercion rationale also fails to recognize
that not all impeachment is done through an attack on the witness' charac-
ter.Y
Recognition of the need to change the common law rule is not a recent
development.3 The federal courts already had made substantial inroads
into the common law rule before the passage of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.2 9 Rule 607 is simply the conclusion to the gradual process of elimi-
nating a common law rule that has-been found lacking in its basic prem-
ises.
While many of the problems involved in the impeachment of witnesses
have been simplified by Rule 607, there is still some controversy over one
type of evidence used to impeach a witness. The authorities disagree over
whether a defendant's prior convictions should be used to impeach his
swore that they believed he spoke the truth. Ladd, supra note 1, at 69-70. Since the party
got a wide choice in selecting who would swear for him, there was no need to allow impeach-
ment by the party calling the witnesses.
Today, however, with the exception of character witnesses and experts, a party does not
really choose his witnesses. Instead, a party must rely on those who by chance happen to know
of facts related to the case on trial.
" See Ladd, supra note 1, at 80-81.
Id., at 82-83. By allowing the adverse party to attack the witness' credibility while
refusing to let the party who called the witness do the same, the rule against the impeachment
of one's own witness appears to leave the party who called the witness at the mercy of the
witness and his adversary. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at § 38.
2 The rationale that suggests a party may be able to coerce his witness into testifying
as he desires applies only to the threat of impeachment by attack on the witness' character.
The most effective type of impeachment, however, is the use of inconsistent statements made
by the witness. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at § 38.
2 Perhaps the most widely cited criticism of the rule forbidding the impeachment of
one's own witness was written as early as 1936. See Ladd, supra note 1.
" Before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rule against the impeach-
ment of one's own witness was modified in the federal court system by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 43(b). That rule allowed the use of leading questions for any unwilling or hostile
witness and the impeachment of adverse witnesses and officers of adverse corporate parties
by any party. FED. R. CIv. PRO. 43(b) (1970). In addition, the federal courts themselves,
including the Fourth Circuit, were moving away from the common law rule. See, e.g., United
States v. Lineberger, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1060
(1972) "("Soundly reasoned cases properly allow impeachment, and the proposed Rules of
Evidence abandon the traditional rule to the contrary".); United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d
347, 351 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 958 (1963) (criminal case which allowed im-
peachment beyond the scope of FED. R. Civ. P. 43(b)).
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credibility as a witness." Federal Rule of Evidence 6093' allows the use of
evidence of prior convictions to impeach a defendant's credibility if certain
conditions are satisfied.3 2 In United States v. Wilson,33 the Fourth Circuit
held that a defendant's testimony may be impeached by a previous convic-
tion in a foreign court if the conditions of Rule 609 are satisfied and the
foreign legal system is hot fundamentally unfair.
In Wilson, the defendant, on trial for rape, took the stand in his own
defense. The trial court ruled that the government could attack the defen-
dant's credibility by questioning him about a previous criminal conviction
in a West German court.34 The defendant appealed his conviction by the
district court, contending that the prior conviction should have been held
inadmissible because the West German legal system lacks many of this
country's procedural protections, including the right to a jury trial. In a
per curiam decision, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
6
In affirming the conviction, the court pointed out that if the defendant
had been convicted in an American court, but in violation of his federal
constitutional right to a jury trial, the vindication of that constitutional
right might have warranted the exclusion of the evidence for impeachment
purposes.37 Since the defendant's trial and conviction in West Germany
were not governed by the provisions of the United States Constitution,
however, the court held there was no constitutional justification for exclud-
ing the conviction for purposes of impeachment.u The court continued by
1 Supporters of the use of a defendant's prior convictions to impeach his credibility as
a witness argue that permitting a defendant with a long criminal record to appear as a witness
with no indication of prior convictions presents the jury with a misleading picture of a
defendant-witness' credibility. See McCORMIcK, supra note 11, at § 43. Detractors of the use
of a defendant's prior convictions for impeachment purposes believe there is a danger that
the jury will consider the past convictions as evidence that the accused is the kind of person
that would commit the crime rather than as evidence of the defendant's credibility as a
witness. See Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017, 1021 (1965). For statistical support
of this danger, see H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMErcAN JuRY at 160-62 (1966).
SI FED. R. EVID. 609.
Rule 609(a) states that to be admissible for impeachment purposes a previous convic-
tion either must have been for a crime that is punishable by death or more than one year in
prison and that has a probative value as evidence which outweighs its prejudicial effect, or a
crime which involves dishonesty or false statement. Rule 609(b) states that a conviction is
not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed from the latter of either the
witness' conviction or release unless the court determines that the probative value of the
conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect.
556 F.2d 1177 (4th Cir. 1977).
3 Id. at 1178. The trial court ruled that the government could ask the defendant whether
he had ever been convicted of a felony, but could not bring out the fact that the prior
conviction was for rape, the charge for which the defendant was accused at trial.
1 Id. at 1178.
35 Id.
3 Id.
1 Id. The court's analysis differentiates between the use for impeachment purposes of
convictions obtained in foreign courts without the defendant having the right to a jury trial
and convictions obtained in the United States without that same right. This distinction was
necessary to distinguish Wilson from the Supreme Court's decision in Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S.
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stating that the only question in Wilson was whether the West German
legal system was so fundamentally unfair that a conviction obtained under
that system was inadmissible."
In deciding that the lack of the right to a jury trial did not make the
West German legal system fundamentally unfair, the Fourth Circuit relied
on Duncan v. Louisiana." A close reading of Duncan indicates that the
Supreme Court has distinguished between those rights granted in the Bill
of Rights which were incorporated into the fourteenth amendment under
the theory that they were essential to the fundamental fairness of every
legal system, and those rights incorporated under the theory that they were
essential to the fundamental fairness of the American legal system.,' Pre-
sumably, convictions obtained in the absence of those rights considered
essential to the fundamental fairness of every legal system will always be
inadmissible for any purpose. Conversely, those convictions obtained in
473 (1972). In Loper, the Supreme Court held that convictions from Mississippi and Tennes-
see could not be used to impeach the defendant's credibility in a later Texas trial when the
prior convictions were constitutionally invalid because the defendant had been denied his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court held that the use of such convictions would
deprive the defendant of due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 405
U.S. at 483. For a discussion of the Loper decision, see Note, Evidence-The Use of Prior
Uncounseled Convictions for Impeachment, 22 DF.PAuL L. REV. 680 (1973).
Presumably, the Supreme Court would not allow the use of convictions obtained in
American courts in violation of the defendant's right to a jury trial for impeachment purposes
either. However, not all violations of federal procedural provisions have been held to require
the exclusion of convictions for impeachment purposes. For example, in Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Supreme Court allowed use of statements obtained from the defen-
dant in violation of his Miranda rights to impeach a defendant who chose to testify in his
own defense. In United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870
(1973), the First Circuit held that the subsequent overturning of a conviction used to impeach
a defendant because of an unconstitutional search and seizure did not require the reversal of
the conviction in which the illegal conviction was used for impeachment.
556 F.2d at 1178.
10 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968). The defendant in Duncan was convicted of a simple
battery, punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment under Louisiana Law, and
sentenced to sixty days in prison and a fine of $150. Id. at 146. The defendant had been denied
the right to a jury trial since the Louisiana Constitution granted jury trials only in cases where
capital punishment or imprisonment might be imposed. Id. The Supreme Court, finding that
trial by jury is fundamental to justice in the American system, held that the fourteenth
amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which, were they tried in
federal court, would come within the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by jury. Id. at 149.
Therefore, the Court reversed the conviction. Id. at 162.
11 As the Duncan opinion points out, the Supreme Court has looked to the Bill of Rights
in determining the scope of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Many of
the rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments to the Constitution have been held to
be protected against state action by the due process clause. 391 U.S. at 147-48. The original
test used by the Court to determine whether one of the rights in the Bill of Rights should be
incorporated into the due process clause was whether that right was essential to fundamental
fairness in all legal systems. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-28 (1937);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67069 (1932). More recently, however, the Court has changed
the test for incorporation to whether the right is essential to fundamental fairness in the
American legal system. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
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the absence of a right considered essential only to the fundamental fairness
of the American legal system will be admissible for purposes of impeach-
ment unless the legal system under which the conviction was obtained is
fundamentally unfair. Relying on Duncan, the Fourth Circuit noted that
the right to a jury trial was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment
under the theory that it is essential to the fundamental fairness of the
American legal system.2 The court then held that the defendant had the
burden of proving that the West German legal system was fundamentally
unfair.13 Under the facts in Wilson, the court found that the defendant
failed to show fundamental unfairness and held that the evidence of the
defendant's prior conviction was properly admitted."
Although slightly strained, the Fourth Circuit's use of tests designed for
incorporating parts of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment to
decide whether a foreign conviction can be used for impeachment purposes
is apparently correct. The use of this test in Wilson produced the same
results found in United States v. Rossi,45 the only case cited in the briefs
of both the defendant46 and the government47 as being a possible precedent
for Wilson. In Rossi, a Second Circuit case, the defendant's prior convic-
tions in Italy were held admissible for the purpose of determining the
defendant's credibility as a witness. The Rossi decision's value as a pre-
cedent, however, is diminished somewhat by the Second Circuit's failure,
to discuss any differences between the Italian and American legal systems.
The major weakness in the Wilson decision was the Fourth Circuit's
omission of any explaination as to what the defendant needed to show to
prove that the West German legal system was fundamentally unfair.
Under the Duncan rationale applied in Wilson,49 any legal system lacking
one of those safeguards necessary for fairness in all legal systems in unfair.
The Fourth Circuit, however, did not find that the West German legal
system lacked any of those fundamental safeguards discussed in Duncan.
Therefore, if the defendant was to keep the government from using his
West German conviction to impeach his testimony, he needed to prove
that the West German legal system. was unfair despite the fact that it did
have those safeguards necessary for fairness in all legal systems. The fact
that the American legal system is rendered unfair by the lack of the right
to a jury trial, a right not essential to fairness in all legal systems, indicates
that this situation can occur."0 Unfortunately, the Wilson court's decision
42 556 F.2d at 1178. Before Duncan, the Supreme Court had held in Palko v. United
States, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), that the right to trial by jury was not essential to fairness in all
legal systems. See note 41 supra.
556 F.2d at 1178.
" Id. at 1178.
219 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955).
46 Brief for Appellant at 39, United States v. Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177 (4th Cir. 1977).
17 Brief for Appellee at 47, United States v. Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177 (4th Cir. 1977).
' 219 F.2d at 616.
See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
See text accompanying note 42 supra.
[Vol. XXXV
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
set no standards for determining how a defendant can prove unfairness in
a legal system which has those safeguards necessary in all legal systems.
The Fourth Circuit's failure to set standards for determining the fair-
ness of foreign legal systems that have those few procedural safeguards
necessary for fairness in all systems, but lack some of the safeguards the
American system offers, condemns the next defendent who has a prior
conviction in such a legal system to guessing what he must do to prove his
conviction unfair. The defendant's guess will influence his decision as to
whether or not he should testify. A decision by the defendant to testify
based on the incorrect assumption that the foreign convictions will not be
admitted could be fatal to the defendant's case. The admission of the
foreign convictions might influence the jury to convict the defendant de-
spite the fact that previous convictions are supposed to be considered only
to determine the defendant's credibility as a witness. 5' Forcing the defen-
dant to make this type of decision seems inconsistent with the American
legal system's emphasis on a fair trial for all those accused of crimes.
B. Admissibility of Evidence
Out-of-Court Statements
The hearsay rule traditionally has prohibited the use of out-of-court
statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' If a witness' credibil-
ity has been impeached by an attack on the motive for his testimony,
however, the witness' prior consistent statements are admissible at com-
mon law solely to rehabilitate his credibility.2 A prior consistent statement
11 FED. R. EVID. 609 allows the admission of prior convictions only for purposes of attack-
ing a witness' credibility. There is statistical evidence, however, that indicates that a jury
will consider the prior convictions as evidence that the accused is the type of person who
would commit the crime rather than as evidence of the defendant's credibility as a witness.
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERicAN JURY at 160-62 (1966).
1 Hearsay evidence has been defined as "testimony in court, or written evidence, of a
statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth
of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-
court asserter." C. McCoRMCK, EVIDENCE § 246 at 584 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMIcK]. Hearsay is not admitted at trial since it is not considered trustworthy. United
States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 1969); Oltman v. Miller, 407 F.2d 376, 378
(7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 576 (2d Cir.
1961). See also McCoRMICK, supra, § 245 at 581. To ensure the credibility of evidence and
avoid hearsay objections, witnesses ordinarily are required to testify under three conditions:
oath, personal presence at trial, and cross-examination. MCCORMICK, supra, § 245 at 581. See
also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
2 United States v. DeLaMotte, 434 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
921 (1971) (holding admissible prior consistent statements made prior to alleged motive for
falsification). See also cases cited at Annot., 75 A.L.R. 2d 909, §§ 20, 23, 45 (1961). Prior
consistent statements are not admitted to bolster a witness' credibility if the witness' credibil-
1978]
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must have been made before the basis of the attack on the witness' motive
arose to be admissible.' The use of prior consistent statements to rehabili-
tate a witness' testimony has been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(B).4
In United States v. Well,' the Fourth Circuit held that the admission
of a prior consistent statement made by the government's principal witness
was error since the motive used to attack the witness' credibility arose
before the prior consistent statement was made.6 Defendant Weil was con-
victed in district court of aiding and abetting the passing of counterfeit
currency. 7 The government's principal witness had given a signed state-
ment to investigating officers shortly after he was arrested for the same
offense.' At trial, the government asked its witness on direct examination
whether his testimony was substantially the same as the out-of-court state-
ment he had given the investigating officer. No objection was raised to the
question at this point. On cross-examination, the defendant attempted to
show that before the witness gave his statement to the investigating officer,
the witness was promised leniency if he implicated the defendant. 0 On
redirect examination, the government again asked the witness whether his
testimony was the same as the previous statement he had given investigat-
ing officers." The witness was allowed to answer over the defendant's
ity has not been impeached. United States v. Navarro-Varelas, 541 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 751 (1977); United States v. Smith, 490 F.2d 789, 792 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068, 1082 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909
(1975) (denying admission of prior consistent statements since such statements were made
after motive to falsify arose). See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE at T 607[08] (1975)
[hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN].
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) states that a prior consistent statement is not hearsay if the
declarant testifies in court subject to cross-examination and the statement is offered to rebut
an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive. Rule 801(d) differs somewhat from the common law in that it declares that state-
ments falling under its scope can be used substantively as well as for rehabilitative purposes.
This change removes the need for the trial judge to give limiting instructions to the jury when
a prior consistent statement is introduced. The Advisory Committee's explanation for the
change is that if a prior statement is consistent with the testimony given on the stand, and if
the opposing party wishes to open the door for its admission, there is no sound reason for not
receiving the prior consistent statement as substantive evidence. Notes of Advisory Commit-
tee, FED. R. EVD. 801(d). Not only is there no good reason to limit the admission of these
statements, there is little chance that a jury would follow such instructions even if they were
given. Comment, Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal Rules: A Discretionary Approach, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1092-93 (1969).
561 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1110-11.
7 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 472 (1970).
1 561 F.2d at 1110.
9Id.
11 Although the court noted that the record was not absolutely clear, it assumed that the
prior consistent statement, as the defendant contended, was not made prior to the bargain
made between the witness and the government. Id. at 1111 n.2.
1 Id. at 1110.
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objection.'2 On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the defendant claimed that
the district court erred in admitting evidence of the prior consistent state-
ment without the witness' testimony first having been impeached.
13
The Fourth Circuit agreed that the government's attempt to bolster the
witness' testimony on direct examination was improper because the wit-
ness' testimony had not been attacked. 4 However, the admission of the
prior consistent statements on direct examination was not reversible error
since the defendant did not object to the statements. The court continued
by noting that the defendant's attempt on cross-examination to show the
witness had been promised leniency if he implicated the defendant did call
into question the witness' motive. 5 The record indicated the witness' state-
ment to the investigating officer was made after the witness was offered
the deal for leniency." Since the prior consistent statement was not made
before the offer of leniency and, therefore, did nothing to indicate the
witness' testimony was not influenced by the offer of leniency, the Fourth
Circuit held that the defendant's objection on redirect examination should
have been sustained. 7 Once again, however, the court found that the error
was not reversible. Since the prior consistent statements had already been
admitted on direct examination, the court reasoned that any error on
redirect did not further impair the defendant's rights.'
Although Federal Rule of Evidence 804(d) (1) (B) allows the use of prior
consistent statements when the witness' motive has been called into ques-
tion, the language of the rule does not state that the prior consistent
statement must be made before the alleged improper motive arose."9 To
require otherwise, however, would ignore the basic reason for the prior
consistent statement rule. The basis for this rule has always been to allow
into evidence only those hearsay statements which by their very nature
tend to support the credibility of a witness previously attacked by another
party." The prior consistent statement in Weil did not support the credi-
bility of the witness. The Weil decision indicates the Fourth Circuit will
require that prior consistent statements be made before the alleged impro-
per motive arose when applying Rule 804(d)(1)(B).
Out-of-court statements may also be admitted under the coconspirato r
rule. The common law coconspirator rule allows the use of certain out-of-
court statements made by a conspirator against a defendant.2' Under the
12 Id.
" Id. at 1110.
u Id. at 1110-11.
n Id. at 1111.
, See note 10 supra.
7 561 F.2d at 1110-11.
" Id. at 1111.
, For the language of Rule 804(d)(1)(B), see note 4 supra.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 801(d)(1)(B)[01].
5' The coconspirator rule has a long history and is well established in this country. The
Supreme Court recognized the rule as early as 1827. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 460, 469 (1827) (once conspiracy has been established, act of one conspirator, in
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common law rule, statements by any conspirator may be used substan-
tively as well as for impeachment purposes2 against all conspirators if
made during the pendency23 and in furtherance 24 of a conspiracy. Indepen-
dent evidence showing the defendant to be a part of a conspiracy is neces-
sary for the application of the coconspirator rule.2 5 The traditional ration-
ale for the admission of such evidence is that coconspirators are agents
and, therefore, liable for each other's declarations.
26
In Joyner v. United States,21 the Fourth Circuit applied the common
law coconspirator rule2 8 to hold that a conspirator's out-of-court state-
ments, made during the pendency 2 and in furtherance of a conspiracy,"0
furtherance of the enterprise is considered act of all conspirators, and is evidence against all).
See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1079.
The hearsay rule generally excludes from admission as evidence statements made out-
of-court prior to trial. See note 1, supra. At common law prior inconsistent statements made
by a witness were admissible under certain circumstances solely for the purpose of impeach-
ing the credibility of the witness. See MCCORMhCK, supra note 1, at § 251. Statements falling
under the coconspirator rule, however, are admissible for all purposes. United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974).
2 Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 (1974) (coconspirator rule applies if
declarations made during the pendency and in furtherance of the conspiracy); Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1949) (coconspirator rule did not apply since declarations
were not made during the pendency of conspiracy). For a discussion of the pendency require-
ment see note 29 infra.
21 Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 (1974) (coconspirator rule applies if
declarations made during the pendency and in furtherance of the conspiracy) see note 23,
supra; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 490-91 (1963) (refusing to broaden
coconspirator rule beyond statements made in furtherance of conspiracy). For a discussion
of the in furtherance requirement see note 30 infra.
2 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74 (1942) (declarations of coconspirators are
admissible only if there is sufficient independent evidence that the defendant is connected
with the conspiracy); WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1079.
21 See United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 470 (1827); Van Riper v. United
States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926). See also Oakley, From
Hearsay to Eternity: Pendency and the Co-conspirator Exception in California-Fact, Fiction
and a Novel Approach, 16 SANTA CILARA L. REV. 1, 13-16 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Oakley].
The agency rationale for the coconspirator rule has been attacked by several authorities. See
Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prose-
cutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1384-91 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Davenport]. The critics of the rule point out that most exceptions to the hearsay rule rest
on the theory that the excepted hearsay, by its very nature, contains special guarantees of
reliability lacking in hearsay generally. The agency rationale for the coconspirator rule, how-
ever, does not show that a conspirators statements are any more reliable than other types of
hearsay. See, e.g., Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICn. L. REV. 1159, 1164-65 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Levie]; Davenport, supra at 1384-90. One authority suggests that the
real reason for the coconspirator rule is the great probative need for such testimony. The
theory is that the difficulty in proving a conspiracy and the expansion of prosecution for that
offense required a relaxation in the laws of evidence. Levie, supra, at 1166.
547 F.2d 1199 (4th Cir. 1977).
2 The Federal Rules of Evidence, which became effective July 1, 1975, were not in effect
at defendant's trial and have no application to the evidentiary problems that were raised on
appeal. See note 55, infra (current federal rule regarding statements by coconspirators).
1 The coconspirator rule requirements that statements must be made during the pen-
dency and in the furtherance of a conspiracy largely overlap. In fact, a statement can not be
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were admissible as substantive evidence against a defendant even though
the defendant was not being tried on conspiracy charges .3 Defendants
Joyner and Gaines -were convicted for distributing cocaine in violation of
federal narcotics laws.3 2 Before his arrest, but after the sale for which the
made in furtherance of a conspiracy if it is not made during the pendency of the conspiracy.
Both the in furtherance requirement and the during the pendency requirement have as a
purpose the screening out of declarations which might have been made exclusively to absolve
the declarant by incriminating someone else. See Levie, supra note 26, at 1173.
A declaration made after a conspiracy has ended does not meet the pendency require-
ment and is not admissible under the coconspirator rule. In Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440 (1949), the Supreme Court held that declarations made while conspirators were
attempting to escape punishment for the conspiracy were not during the pendency of the
conspiracy. In so holding, the Court indicated the duration of a conspiracy is limited to a
conspiracy's main aim. Id. at 442-44. The difficulty is in determining when a conspiracy's
main aim has ended. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit defined the duration of a conspiracy
as continuing until its termination has been affirmatively shown. United States v. Blackshire,
538 F.2d 569, 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 840 (1976). See also United States v.
Cirillo, 468 F.2d 1233-1239 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973) (holding a conspir-
acy is ongoing until its termination is affirmatively shown). In Joyner, defendant Gaines
claimed that Joyner's statements were made after the conspiracy had ended. 547 F.2d at 1203.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that since there was no showing that the conspiracy
had terminated or that Gaines had withdrawn, the conspiracy was ongoing. Id.
31 The in furtherance requirement is so similar to the pendency requirement that courts
rarely find one requirement without the other. But see United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068,
1066-77 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976) (Pendency requirement met but
statement excluded as not in furtherance of the conspiracy). In addition, some courts have
diluted the in furtherance requirement so that any connection between the conspiracy and
declaration is sufficient. See, e.g., Zamloch v. United States, 193 F.2d 889, 890-91 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952) (narrative declarations of past events were held in further-
ance of conspiracy); Vitagraph, Inc. v. Perelman, 95 F.2d 142, 146-47 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 610 (1938) (conspiracy to stop double featuring movies; speech of one member of
conspiracy to others who just listened admissible against all). Generally, the requirement is
such that when a statement occurs during a conspiracy and is relevant enough to be offered
against the defendant its role in the furtherance of the conspiracy will be self-evident. Oakley,
supra note 26, at 25-26. The Fourth Circuit apparently found the fulfillment of the in further-
ance requirement for the statement involved in Joyner to be self-evident. After recognizing
that the declaration must be in furtherance of the conspiracy, 547 F.2d at 1202, the court
failed to comment on how the facts of the case fulfill this requirement. Since the witness'
declaration concerned the supply of the cocaine sold in the conspiracy, the declaration was
arguably in furtherance of the conspiracy.
31 547 F.2d at 1201. The courts agree that the coconspirator rule applies even though the
defendant is not charged with involvement in a conspiracy. United States v. Sapperstein, 312
F.2d 694, 698 (4th Cir. 1963); Garber v. United States, 145 F.2d 966, 969 (6th Cir. 1944); Lee
Dip v. United States, 92 F.2d 802, 803 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 638 (1938). This
apparent contradiction in terms can be explained by the agency rationale for the coconspiracy
rule. See note 26, supra. Since the coconspirator rule is based on the fact that the conspirators
are agents of each other rather than on a formal conspiracy charge, whether the coconspirators
are actually indicted for conspiracy is unimportant. United States v. Olweiss, 138 F.2d 798,
799-800 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 744 (Learned Hand explaining that the admis-
sion of declarations of a conspirator are not dependent upon an indictment, but are admitted
as incident to the general principle of agency).
11 547 F.2d at 1201. The government severed conspiracy charges against Joyner and
Gaines and proceeded only on the substantive charge of unlawful distribution of cocaine. Id.
at 1202.
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defendants were convicted, Joyner told an FBI undercover agent that he
had obtained his cocaine from Gaines and that Gaines source had "dried
up.' ' ' When Joyner testified at trial that Gaines was not involved in the
sale of cocaine, 31 the government questioned Joyner on cross-examination
about his previous statements to the FBI agent.'1 The district court allowed
the jury to consider this testimony.
On appeal, Gaines claimed 3 that since Joyner's out-of-court statement
was a prior inconsistent statement, the district court erred in not instruct-
ing the jury to consider it solely for impeaching Joyner.3 7 The Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Joyner's statement
could be used substantively against Gaines since there was sufficient inde-
pendent evidence to show a prima facie case of conspiracy and to invoke
the coconspirator rule .3 The independent evidence referred to by the
Fourth Circuit involved testimony concerning the sale of cocaine for which
the defendants were convicted. The FBI agent to whom the sale was made
testified that Gaines was present when Joyner gave the agent a bag of
cocaine in exchange for fourteen hundred dollars; that Gaines stated the
price would go down if he bought the cocaine in larger quantities; and that
Gaines helped to complete the transaction by making change.
3 9
While the admission of a conspirator's declaration under the coconspir-
ator rule depends upon a showing by independent evidence that the defen-
dant is involved in a conspiracy," the amount of evidence needed to meet
this requirement is uncertain. 4' The Supreme Court has defined the
amount of independent evidence needed as "substantial, independent evi-
l Id. at 1201.
Id. Joyner's testimony was in response to Gaines' attorney's questioning about his
client's involvement.
1 Id. Joyner claimed that he lied to the FBI agent when the government asked him about
his earlier conversation with the agent.
3 Gaines also contended on appeal that the district court had abused its discretion in
refusing to grant his motion for a severance. The Fourth Circuit found no support for this
contention. Id.
11 Id. at 1202. The common law prior inconsistent statement exception to the hearsay
rule allows prior inconsistent statements made by a witness to be admitted for the purpose
of impeaching the witness, but not as substantive evidence. The exception requires that the
jury be so instructed. The danger, of course, is that the jury may disregard the instructions.
See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1018. For the effect of the Federal Rules of Evidence on
the admission of prior consistent statements, see Blakely, Substantive Use of Prior Inconsist-
ent Statements Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64 KEN. L.J. 3 (1975). For a comparison
of the prior inconsistent statement rule and the coconspirator rule, see note 22 supra.
" 547 F.2d at 1203.
n Id.
"' See note 25 supra. For a list of additional cases holding that a conspiracy must be
shown with evidence independent of the conspirator's statements, see Bergman, The Cocon-
spirator's Exception: Defining the Standard of the Independent Evidence Test Under the
New Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 HoFsTRA L. REv. 99, 99 n.3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Bergman].
11 See Evidence, Fourth Circuit Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 607-08 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Fourth Circuit Review]. See also Bergman, supra note 40, at 100-3.
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dence of the conspiracy, at least enough to take the question to the jury.' 4 2
In United States v. Stroupe,4 3 the Fourth Circuit listed two standards
which it concluded reflect the Supreme Court's definition of the indepen-
dent evidence requirement: the showing of a prima facie case of conspir-
acy,44 or a conspiracy shown by a clear preponderance of the evidence. 5
While the court used the preponderance of the evidence standard in
Stroupe,45 the Joyner decision required the demonstration of a prima facie
case of conspiracy.
7
The two standards used by the Fourth Circuit are similar, but not
identical. The prima facie case of conspiracy standard requires that the
trial judge draw all inferences favorable to the government in determining
whether the independent evidence presents a prima facie case. 8 Therefore,
even though a judge does not believe the witness giving the independent
evidence, he must consider the witness truthful for the purposes of deter-
mining whether a prima facie case is present. Moreover, there is some
question as to what amount of proof is required to meet the prima facie
case of conspiracy test. While one circuit requires that the evidence must
prove the defendant was involved in a conspiracy beyond the shadow of a
doubt,49 most jurisdictions use a lower standard. 0 The prima facie case of
conspiracy standard, requiring proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt .
and drawing all inferences in favor of the government, does not give the
defendant much protection against the possibility that an alleged cocon-
spirator's out-of-court declarations are not credible.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 n.14 (1974).
a 538 F.2d 1063 (4th Cir. 1976). Defendant Stroupe was arrested and convicted of dealing
in amphetamine. Id. at 1064. The Fourth Circuit reversed Stroupe's conviction, holding the
evidence insufficient to convict Stroupe without the admission of hearsay statements made
by an alleged coconspirator of Stroupe. Id. at 1064. The court held that the statements could
not be admitted under the coconspirator rule since there was not sufficient independent
evidence to indicate Stroupe was involved in a conspiracy. Id.
11 538 F.2d at 1065.
SId.
" Id. at 1066.
547 F.2d at 1203.
538 F.2d at 1066. See also S. SALZBERG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 463 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SALZBERG & REDDEN].
1' United States v. Oliva, 397 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the independent
evidence of conspiracy must be sufficient to support a finding by a jury that the defendant
was himself a conspirator).
I The other circuits which use the prima facie case of conspiracy test do not state that
the standard involves proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Morton,
483 F.2d 573, 576 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Spanos, 462 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 41 (6th Cir. 1965), aff'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 293
(1966). In Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964), the Ninth Circuit, which uses the prima facie case of conspiracy test, specifically
rejected the ,contention that the conspiracy must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 736. In the Joyner opinion, the Fourth Circuit noted the Carbo rejection of the reasonable
doubt standard of proof. 547 F.2d at 1203, n.8. While rejecting the reasonable doubt standard,
the Fourth Circuit did not indicate what standard of proof was needed.
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The preponderance of the evidence standard seems preferable because
it offers the defendant more protection. The preponderance of the evidence
standard does not require the trial judge to draw all inferences in favor of
the government. Instead, the judge determines whether he feels, based on
his own assessment of the evidence and of the credibility of witnesses, that
the independent evidence indicates that the defendant was involved in a
conspiracy. ',' If the judge finds the independent evidence meets the prepon-
derance of the evidence requirement, he allows the trier of fact to consider
the conspirators statements in determining whether the defendant is
guilty.
Although the Fourth Circuit did not use the fair preponderance of the
evidence test, the facts in Joyner indicated that the coconspirator rule
would have applied regardless of the standard used. The independent evi-
dence of Gaines' presence and actions during the sale of the cocaine was
similar to the evidence found sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
conspiracy in other narcotics cases.52 The fact that the government's inde-
pendent evidence was circumstantial in nature was no bar to finding that
Gaines was involved in a conspiracy since the Supreme Court had held
previously that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to demonstrate a de-
fendant is involved in a conspiracy. 3 Since there was sufficient indepen-
dent evidence to indicate the defendant was involved in a conspiracy, all
the common law requirements for the application of the coconspirator rule
were present in Joyner." The case, thus, reaffirmed the existing common
law coconspirator rule.
There is no indication that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence would have lead to any changes in the Joyner decision. Rule
801(d)(2)(E)55 incorporates the "in furtherance" and "during the pen-
dency" requirements for applying the coconspirator rule into the Federal
Rules. In addition, Stroupe, decided after the adoption of the Federal
Rules, indicates that the Fourth Circuit still requires independent evi-
dence that the conspirator is involved in a conspiracy for application of the
rule. ."
SALZBERG & REDDEN, supra note 48, at 465.
See, e.g., United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 1967) (evidence that
defendant drove seller to narcotics sales created inference that defendant was seller's supplier
was sufficient to prove prima facie case of conspiracy); United States v. lacullo, 226 F.2d 788,
795 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 966 (1956) (fingerprints of defendants on package
containing narcotics sufficient to prove prima facie case of conspiracy). For additional cases,
see 34 Fourth Circuit Review, supra note 41, at 610 n.16.
"1 See Glasser v. United States, 314 U.S. 60 (1942) (holding that circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy).
11 For the fulfillment of the in furtherance and pendency requirements in Joyner, see note
29 & 30, supra.
1 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a "statement is not hearsay if .. .the state-
ment is offered against a party and is. . .a statement by a conspirator of a party during the
course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy."




In order to be considered as evidence by the trier of fact, documents
must be authenticated.57 The purpose of the authentication requirement
is to prevent fraud and guard against the chance of crediting a writing to
one who merely has the same name as the author." Authentication requires
that evidence allegedly having a particular association with an individual,
time or place be linked with that individual, time or place either before or
after its admission. 9 The authentication requirement also tests the rele-
vancy of the document. 0 Since evidence becomes admissible only upon a
showing of the condition of fact upon which its relevancy depends, evi-
dence is considered irrelevant until the necessary connection is made."
In Trustees of C.I. Mortgage Group v. Cantrell (In re James E. Long
Construction Co.), 62 the Fourth Circuit held that the lien waiver involved
satisfied the authentication requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 90163
and could be considered as evidence by the trier of fact. In Long
Construction, a lien waiver64 was prepared for James E. Long Construction
Co. (Long Construction). The written waiver allegedly was signed by sup-
pliers of labor and materials, including one Kelly Cantrell. 5 Apparently,
the signatures on the waiver were obtained by one Moran, who had been
superintendent of Long Construction before his death.6 After incurring
financial difficulties, Long Construction initiated proceedings under Chap-
ter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.6" At the proceedings, the lien waiver was
introduced through the testimony of the attorney who prepared the docu-
ment.6 Following the introduction of the lien waiver, two of the alleged
signers testified that they could not remember signing the paper, but
a See United States v. Gassaway, 456 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding refusal to admit
an allegedly exculpatory letter proper when letter was not authenticated); Grey v. First Nat.
Bank in Dallas, 393 F.2d 371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968) (holding that party
who seeks to introduce written evidence must in some way authenticate it).
11 See McCormick, supra note 1, at § 218; Symposium, Best Evidence and Authentica-
tion of Documents, 21 Loy. L. REV. 450, 460 (1975).
" Symposium, Authentication, Identification, and the Best Evidence Rule, 36 LA. L.
REv. 185, 186 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Authentication].
" McCoRNUcK, supra note 1, at § 218.
" Authentication, supra note 58, at 186.
557 F.2d 1039 (4th Cir. 1977).
The Federal Rules of Evidence include three rules dealing with authentication. Rule
902 governs certain types of documents that do not require extrinsic evidence for authentica-
tion. When a document is not covered by Rule 902, the document must meet the requirements
for authentication set out in Rule 901. Finally, Rule 903 abolishes the common law require-
ment that attesting witnesses be produced or accounted for, except with respect to documents
which must be attested to be valid, i.e., wills in some states.
" A lien waiver is the release of a security of incumbrance which one person has upon
the property of another.
" 557 F.2d at 1040.
SId.
Brief for Appellant at 5.
557 F.2d at 1040.
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would not deny their signatures." Cantrell, the party contesting the au-
thenticity of the document did not testify." The bankruptcy court admit-
ted the waiver.7' On appeal, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court in an unpublished decision.
7
1
On appeal from the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit rea-
soned that when a document is admitted subject to the introduction of
evidence sufficient to fulfill the authentication requirement, a trial judge
has at least two decisions to make. 7 First, he must make a preliminary
determination as to whether the foundation evidence is sufficient to admit
the item temporarily.74 If the item is conditionally admitted, the judge
must then decide on the basis of all the evidence whether a jury could
conclude the existence of the particular fact on which the relevancy of the
evidence depends. 75 In addition, when the proceeding involved is one in
which the judge is serving as the trier of fact, as in Long Construction, he
must also make the final determination of whether the document is au-
thentic .
7
The Fourth Circuit held that the bankruptcy judge was justified in
making all three decisions in favor of admitting the lien waiver.77 Although
it is difficult to determine from the Long Construction court's opinion what
evidence the bankruptcy judge had heard before making his initial deter-
mination 78 the decision was apparently based on the testimony given by
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1041. The vice-president of Long Construction testified that he did not specifi-
cally recall the document, but might have returned it to the attorney's office after completion,
and that waivers of the type in question were customarily executed by Long Construction in
the regular course of its business.
11 Id. at 1040-41. Although Long Construction involved the question of whether the lien
waiver followed the authentication standards of Rule 901, only the authentication of Can-
trell's signature was in question. Id. at 1040. Even if Cantrell had contested the authenticity
of the lien waiver itself, there is little doubt that the testimony of the attorney who prepared
the waiver would have been sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 901. The attorney's
testimony could not, however, authenticate the signatures on the waiver since the attorney
did not see the signing of the waiver.
72 Id. at 1040.
Id. See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 901(a)[01]. The reasoning used by the
Fourth Circuit for determining whether Cantrell's signature was authentic followed directly
from the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 901(a) points
out that the authentication standard of Rule 901 is subject to the procedure set forth in Rule
104(b). Rule 104(b) provides that the court shall admit evidence whose relevancy depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact when that condition has been fulfilled or subject
to its fulfillment. The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 104(b) states that the judge makes
a preliminary determination of whether the foundation evidence is sufficient to support a
finding of fulfillment of the condition. If the evidence is sufficient, the item is temporarily
admitted. When all the evidence is in and the judge decides a jury could reasonably conclude
the fulfillment of the condition, he allows them to consider the evidence.
71 557 F.2d at 1040.
7 Id.
' Id. at 1040-41.
Id. at 1040.
7 The transcript of the bankruptcy proceeding was unavailable to the Fourth Circuit
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the drafting attorney and Long Construction's vice-president. 7 Since the
determination of the sufficiency of the foundation evidence lies in the
discretion of the trial court and may be reversed only for an abuse of that
discretion, 0 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's initial de-
termination to admit temporarily the lien waiver."
In concluding that the evidence was sufficient to allow the trier of fact
to consider whether Cantrell's signature was authentic and in holding that
the bankruptcy court, as trier of the fact, was correct in determining that
the signature was authentic, the Fourth Circuit appeared to rely heavily
on the fact that Cantrell did not testify. The court inferred that Cantrell
was silent because he could not deny the signature on the lien waiver was
his. 2 As the court pointed out, other jurisdictions have ruled that such an
unexplained silence creates a presumption that the party's testimony
would have been adverse to his interest." At least one state court has held
that such silence would entitle the judge to presume the signature was that
of the silent party.M In Long Construction, the Fourth Circuit held only
that there was a permissible inference from Cantrell's silence that the
signature was his and, therefore, authentic. 5
Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) states that the authentication require-
ment is satisfied "by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what is proponent claims.""9 The authentication
requirement of Rule 901, however, need not be fulfilled by one piece of
evidence." In Long Construction, the permissible inference drawn from
Cantrell's silence, combined with the other evidence before the court, was
sufficient to allow the trier of fact to conclude that the lien waiver was
authentic. Long Construction was the first Fourth Circuit decision to deal
with Rule 901 and indicates the rule will be strictly applied in the future.
C. The Burden of Persuasion in Federal Tax Cases
The term "burden of proof' actually encompasses two separate con-
because of the malfunction of an electronic recording device. The parties involved stated on
appeal that they would rely on the statement of facts by the bankruptcy judge and stipula-
tions in the record. Id. at 1040.
7' See note 70, supra.
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1975), aff'd on rehearing,
534 F.2d 207, 213 (10th Cir. 1976). See also 3 GORD, JONES ON EVIDENCE, § 17.1 at 239 (6th
ed. 1972).
11 557 F.2d at 1041.
'2Id.
See, e.g., Daniel v. United States, 234 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
971 (1956); Meir v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 392, 396 (8th Cir. 1952).
Pucket v. Draper, 156 Va. 238, 252-54, 158 S.E. 68 (Va. 1931).
'5 557 F.2d at 1041.
FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
Any combination of items of evidence will suffice to show authentication so long as
the standard of Rule 901(a) is satisfied. WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, at I 901(b)(1)[01].
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cepts, the burden of producing evidence' and the burden of persuasion.2
Normally, both of these burdens are placed on the party who pleads the
existence of the disputed fact.' Certain policy reasons,4 however, may oper-
ate to shift the normal placement of the burdens of proof. These policy
shifts are called presumptions.5 While the ultimate effect of a presumption
on the burdens of proof has been sharply disputed,' Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 3011 should resolve this issue in most cases for the federal courts.
One area in which the placement of the burdens of proof and the effect
of a presumption are not settled entirely is that of federal tax cases. This
uncertainty is due to the several methods by which a tax action may be
pursued' and the presumption in favor of the government's tax assessment
when a taxpayer has failed to keep records While the presumption in
I The burden of producing evidence sometimes is referred to as the burden of evidence
or the duty of going forward. The burden of producing evidence lies with the party who must
first produce evidence to avoid an adverse ruling. To avoid a directed verdict, the party with
the burden of producing evidence must produce enough evidence for a reasonable man to
draw the inference that the fact to be proven exists. If the party who first has the duty of
going forward produces evidence from which a reasonable man could not help but infer the
fact to be proven, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the other party. See C. MCCOR-
MICK, EVIDENCE §§ 336-38 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
2 The burden of persuasion sometimes is referred to as the risk of nonpersuasion or
simply the burden of proof. This burden lies with the party who will lose on that issue if the
jury can not decide which party should prevail. As a general rule, the burden of persuasion
is assigned only once, when it is time for a decision. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at §§ 336-
37.
MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 337.
Occasionally, the normal allocation of the burdens of proof will create an imbalance
due to one party's superior access to the proof. The courts will try to correct such imbalances
by shifting the burdens of proof. See MCCORMICK, supra note-1, at § 343.
1 For example, a properly addressed, stamped and mailed letter is presumed to have
been delivered to the addressee; a child born to a married woman is presumed to be the
legitimate offspring of the husband; and a violent death, the cause of which is unknown, is
presumed not to be a suicide. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 343.
' The prevailing view is that a presumption shifts only the burden of producing evidence.
J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 314, 336 (1898). Under this theory, called the
"Bursting Bubble Theory" or the Thayer theory, once evidence is produced by an adversary,
the presumption is spent and disappears. The only practical effect of a presumption under
the Thayer theory is that it saves the party from a directed verdict and entitles him to a
directed verdict when an opponent fails to introduce evidence against the fact in issue. See
Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REv. 195, 210 (1953).
The critics of the Thayer theory claim that the theory accords presumptions too "slight
and evanescent" an effect. Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence,
50 HARV. L. REV. 903, 913 (1937). These critics feel that a presumption should also shift the
burden of persuasion. Reaugh, Presumptions and the Burden of Proof, 36 ILL. L. REV. 803,
819 (1942). By shifting the burden of persuasion a presumption would change the outcome of
those cases in which the trier of the fact is left in doubt.
I FED. R. EVID. 301 states that a presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence,
but that the burden of persuasion remains upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
Tax actions arise in several different procedural settings. Among the various types of
actions are refund suits, see text accompanying notes 28-31 infra, deficiency suits, see note
32 infra, and collection suits, see text accompanying notes 32-36 infra.
I The presumption in favor of the government's tax assessment is granted to encourage
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favor of the government's tax assessment operates to place the initial bur-
den of producing evidence on the taxpayer in all tax actions,'0 placement
of the burden of persuasion varies with the type of tax case involved.
In Higgenbotham v. United States," the Fourth Circuit considered the
proper placement of the burden of persuasion for a governmental counter-
claim in a tax refund suit.'2 The case arose out of a dispute which followed
a raid by the IRS on the taxpayer's gambling operations.' 3 The IRS deter-
mined the taxpayer owed $353,082.06 in wagering excise taxes'4 and as-
sessed that amount against him. 5 Higgenbotham paid $293.50 of the as-
sessment and then brought a refund suit.'" The government then filed a
counterclaim for the amount of the unpaid balance.'"
At trial in district court, Higgenbotham admitted that he was not enti-
tled to a refund and that he owed more money.'" The court then instructed
the jury that the only remaining question was the amount Higgenbotham
owed.'" When both parties objected to the court's instructions to the jury
on the placement of the burdens of proof, the trial judge called the jury
back for additional instructions.2 The revised instructions on the counter-
claim placed the burden of producing evidence on the taxpayer and the
burden of persuasion on the government.2 ' The government renewed its
objection, claiming that the burden of persuasion should have been placed
on the taxpayer as it was in the refund suit itself. 22 When the jury found
that Higgenbotham owed less than one-seventh of the amount the govern-
ment assessed, the government appealed.
23
taxpayers to keep records and to facilitate the collection of taxes needed to run the govern-
ment. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935). See also United States v. Lease,
346 F.2d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 1965).
01 Fuller v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 73, 76 (6th Cir. 1963) (deficiency suit); Plisco v.
United States, 306 F.2d 784, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (collection suit); Veino v. Fahs, 257 F.2d
364, 367 (5th Cir. 1958) (refund suit).
556 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1977).
22 Id. at 1175.
13 Id. at 1174.
14 I.R.C. § 4401 (1975) provides that all wagers shall be subject to an excise tax of two
percent of the wager. At the time the facts leading to Higgenbotham arose, the excise tax on
wagers was ten percent.
11 556 F.2d at 1174. The government determined the amount taxpayer Higgenbotham
owed by using information it obtained from the records seized from the taxpayer to estimate
the amount of gross wagers the taxpayer had accepted during the two taxable years involved.
Brief for Appellant at 3.
11 Id. at 1174. The excise tax for gambling is assessed for each wager, I.R.C. § 4401. Thus
the $293.50 paid by Higgenbotham represents full payment on some of the assessed wagers
rather than a partial payment towards one overall assessment. See note 29 supra.
" 556 F.2d at 1174.
2 Id. Higgenbotham admitted owing approximately $26,363.05 in addition to the amount
he had already paid. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
1g 556 F.2d at 1174.
2 Id.
21 Id. at 1174-75.
2 Id. at 1175.
m The jury returned a verdict of $48,388.92 for the government. Id.
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In affirming the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit held the
district court's instructions, although not a precise statement of the law,
were not reversible error. 4 The court determined that in a counterclaim to
a refund suit the taxpayer has the burden of persuasion on whether the
government's assessment was erroneous and the government has the bur-
den of persuasion on the amount taxpayer actually owes. In determining
the placement of the burden of persuasion, the court reasoned that the
government should bear the same burden of proof on a counterclaim to
collect taxes as it does in a collection suit." The Fourth Circuit pointed
out that the government is the moving party in both actions and the issue
is whether the government is entitled to collect the amount of taxes as-
sessed.27
The rationale behind the Fourth Circuit's holding and the rationale for
the government's claim both stem from the procedural aspects of the dif-
ferent methods for pursuing tax actions. To bring a refund suit,2 a tax-
payer must pay the amount the government has assessed and then file
for a refund of the amount he claims he has been unjustly assessed. Since
the taxpayer is claiming he is owed the refund, the burden of producing
evidence and the burden of persuasion are on the taxpayer in all refund
suits." The amount of refund the taxpayer should receive is determined
on the basis of how much the taxpayer actually owed. Thus, in order to
receive a refund a taxpayer must not only prove the government's assess-
ment was wrong, but also the amount he should have been assessed."'
A collection suit arises when the taxpayer neither pays the govern-
ment's assessment nor files a deficiency suit. 2 The IRS then files a civil
24 Id. at 1176.
2 Id. at 1175.
9 Id.
v Id.
The taxpayer can bring a refund suit in either a district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1970),
or the Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970). If the taxpayer brings a refund suit in a
district court, he has the right to a jury trial and the right of appeal to the appropriate court
of appeals. In the Court of Claims, a jury trial is not available and the only chance for review
is by the Supreme Court. Another difference between the two courts is that the district court
is bound by the established case law of its court of appeals, while the Court of Claims is not.
See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOMe TAXATION § 297 (2d Ed. 1973).
1 Ordinarily, one of the requirements for bringing a refund suit is full payment of the
government's assessment. Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958). The full payment rule,
however, does not apply to a suit for the refund of excise taxes that are divisible into a tax
on each transaction or event. See Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212, 215 n.6 (4th Cir.
1964). Since the excise tax for gambling is assessed for each wager, I.R.C. § 4401, the theory
of divisible assessments applied in Higgenbotham, 556 F.2d at 1174 n.1.
Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281 (1932) (holding that in refund suit the claimant must
show that government has money belonging to him). See also Alvary v. United States, 302
F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1962).
31 Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding that in action
for refund of gambling excise taxes a taxpayer must demonstrate the correct amount of the
tax or that he owes no tax at all if he is to recover).
12 When a taxpayer fails to pay the government's assessment, the government sends the
taxpayer a notice of deficiency. The taxpayer can then file a petition with the Tax Court for
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suit to foreclose the resulting tax lien on the taxpayer's property.33 A pre-
sumption that the government's assessment is correct shifts the burden of
producing evidence to the taxpayer.3 4 In addition, the presumption appar-
ently shifts the burden of persuasion on whether the government's assess-
ment was correct to the taxpayer.3 Once the taxpayer shows the assess-
ment was incorrect, the government, as the party making the claim, has
the burden of persuasion on the amount the taxpayer actually owes. 6
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Higgenbotham raises several prob-
lems. In deciding the proper placement of the burden of persuasion for the
counterclaim to the refund suit, the court relied on two Second Circuit
casesY The Second Circuit's decision in DeLorenzo v. United States, 
3
however, indicates the Fourth Circuit misinterpreted the two Second Cir-
cuit decisions upon which it relied. In Delorenzo, which involved a factual
situation nearly identical to that of Higgenbotham,3' the Second Circuit
held that the burden a taxpayer bears in a refund suit "remains with the
taxpayer even though a civil collection suit is brought by the government,
in this case by its counterclaim."4 In so holding, the Second Circuit relied
on Lessor v. United States,4 one, of the cases relied on by the Fourth
Circuit in Higgenbotham. United States v. Lease,4" the other case relied
a redetermination of deficiency. When the taxpayer does file a petition, the action that results
is commonly called a deficiency suit. See I.R.C. §§ 6211-6215.
3' I.R.C. § 6321 gives the government a lien upon the property of a taxpayer who has
refused to pay his tax. I.R.C. § 7403 grants the government the authority to start a civil action
in a district court to enforce the lien.
" For a discussion of the presumption that the government's assessment is correct, see
note 9 supra. In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 441 (1976), the Supreme Court held
that the government's assessment must have some rational foundation for the presumption
to arise. For the foundation the government used in determining the taxpayer's assessment
in Higgenbotham, see note 15 supra.
13 United States v. Lease, 346 F.2d 696, 701 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that in collection suit
the government does not assume burden of persuading the trier of fact what the taxpayer's
correct assessment should be until the taxpayer persuades the trier the government's initial
assessment is erroneous).
3Id.
556 F.2d at 1175.
3 555 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1977).
3 The dispute in DeLorenzo arose following a raid on the taxpayer's gambling opera-
tions. Id. at 29. After the raid, the IRS determined that the taxpayer owed a large wagering
excise tax. Id. at 29. The taxpayer paid a small portion of the assessed tax and filed for a
refund. Id. at 28. The government then counterclaimed for the unpaid balance of the assess-
ment. Id.
1o Id. at 29.
" 368 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1968). In Lessor, the taxpayer sued for a refund of penalty taxes
paid and the government counterclaimed for the collection of the balance of the penalty due.
Id. at 307. The Second Circuit heard the issue of the placement of the burden of proof en
banc. The court decided that the presumption in favor of the governmental assessment shifts
the burden of persuasion on the issue of whether the government's assessment was correct to
the taxpayer. Id. at 310. Since this holding was enough to decide the issue in the case, the
court did not discuss where the burden of persuasion lies once the taxpayer has shown the
government's assessment incorrect.
- 346 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1965).
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on by the Fourth Circuit in Higgenbotham, involved a collection suit, not
a counterclaim to a refund suit. 3 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's apparent
misinterpretation of Lessor and Lease leaves Higgenbotham based on pre-
cedent that does not support its holding.
The Third Circuit, like the Second Circuit, has placed the burden of
persuasion for a governmental counterclaim to a refund suit in the same
manner as in a refund suit, on the taxpayer.4 Only one circuit appears to
agree with the Fourth Circuit's position. 5 In Bar L. Ranch, Inc. v.
Phinney,48 the Fifth Circuit held that when dealing with a governmental
counterclaim the burden of persuasion is on the government to show what
the taxpayer owes once the taxpayer has proven the government's assess-
ment incorrect.47
In reasoning that the burden of persuasion for a counterclaim to a
refund suit should be placed in the same manner as the burden of persua-
sion for a collection suit,4 8 the Fourth Circuit created another problem. By
adopting the collection suit placement of the burden of persuasion, the
court adopted the theory that the presumption in favor of the government
shifts the burden of persuasion concerning the correctness of the govern-
ment's assessment.49 The prevailing view, reflected in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 301, is that a presumption does not shift the burden of persuasion.
0 The question involved in Higgenbotham was essentially whether the burden of persua-
sion for a counterclaim to a refund suit should be placed in the same manner as the burden
of persuasion for a collection suit or the same as the burden of persuasion for a refund suit.
Therefore, using the placement of the burden of persuasion for a collection suit as authority
for the placement of the burden of persuasion for a counterclaim to a refund suit begs the
question.
" In Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1158-60 (3d Cir. 1971), the Third Circuit held
that the taxpayer has the burden of persuasion on a governmental counterclaim to a refund
suit. In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Supreme Court cited several circuits
as holding that the burden of persuasion for showing the correct amount of tax stays with
the taxpayer after the taxpayer has shown the government's assessment was incorrect. 428
U.S. at 442, citing United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 15-17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1039 (1973); Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1158-61 (3d Cir. 1971); Ehlers v.
Vinal, 382 F.2d 58, 65-66 (8th Cir. 1967). Of these cases, however, only Psaty involved a
governmental counterclaim in a refund suit. 442 F.2d at 1153. See also G. M. Leasing Corp.
v. United States, 514 F.2d 935, 941 (10th Cir. 1975).
'1 In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Supreme Court cited two circuits
as holding that the burden of persuasion for showing the correct amount of tax shifts to the
government after the taxpayer has shown the government's assessment was incorrect. 428
U.S. at 442, citing Foster v. Commissioner, 391 F.2d 727, 735 (4th Cir. 1968); Herbert v.
Commissioner, 377 F.2d 65, 69 (9th Cir. 1967). Neither of these cases, however, involved a
governmental counterclaim to a refund suit.
- 426 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1970). In Phinney, a corporate taxpayer brought a refund suit
to recover a delinquent penalty. The government counterclaimed for additional tax, penalty,
and interest allegedly due. Id. at 997.
, See Carson v. United States, 560 F.2d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1977). But see Lidden v.
United States, 448 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1971).
See text accompanying note 26 supra.
" See text accompanying note 34 supra.
See note 6 supra.
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Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's use of the presumption that the govern-
ment's assessment is correct to shift part of the burden of persuasion
conflicts with Federal Rule of Evidence 301. Clearly, the same conflict is
present in the way courts traditionally have placed the burden of persua-
sion in collection suits. Since the method for the placement of the burden
of persuasion in collection suits was developed before the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence,5' the conflict between Rule 301 and collection
suits was unavoidable. The situation is not improved, however, by extend-
ing the conflict to cases involving counterclaims to refund suits. A more
suitable solution might be for the federal courts to reconsider their method
for placing the burden of persuasion in collection suits in light of Rule 301.,
The Fourth Circuit's decision also may lead to several undesirable re-
sults. If the Higgenbotham rule is followed, the burden of persuasion will
be more burdensome for a taxpayer who pays his assessment in ful 5 than
for one who makes only a token payment, files a refund and waits for the
government to counterclaim. 53 Such a result is neither logical nor equita-
ble. " The Fourth Circuit taxpayers relying on Higgenbotham may pay only
small portions of assessed excise taxes in order to force the government to
bring a counterclaim so that they get the benefit of a shift in the burden
of proof.15 By encouraging taxpayers not to pay their full assessments, the
Higgenbotham decision will add delay and uncertainty to the collection of
excise taxes.
Since taxes are vital to the operation of the government and their
prompt and certain availability is an imperious need," court decisions
which hinder the prompt and certain collection of taxes should be avoided.
The Fourth Circuit could have avoided this result in Higgenbotham by
holding, as the government requested, that the burden of persuasion for
the counterclaim be placed completely on the taxpayer, as it is in a refund
suit. If the burden of persuasion for a governmental counterclaim to a
refund suit is placed in the same way it is placed in a refund suit, there
would be little incentive for the taxpayer to delay the payment of his excise
taxes. Since the district court's instructions placed the burden of persua-
sion on the government, the Fourth Circuit should have found that the
district court's instructions were in error and reversed the district court's
decision. In addition to eliminating the taxpayer's incentive to delay pay-
" The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975.
In Hodoh v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ohio 1957), an action for a refund
of excise taxes on wagers that were paid in full, the burden of persuasion was upon the
taxpayer to prove not only that the determination of the tax was wrong, but also to produce
evidence from which another and proper determination could be made.
1 See Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1971).
" Id.
See text accompanying notes 12-17 & 25-27 supra.
Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
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